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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL UPDATES
north ameriCa anD the 
CariBBean
moRe vioLence foR tHe PeoPLe of 
Lomas De PoLeo
Since 2002, the community of Lomas 
de Poleo, a dusty neighborhood on the 
western outskirts of Ciudad Juárez in Chi-
huahua, Mexico has been fighting for 
ownership of land where many residents 
have lived for more than twenty years. The 
original settlers petitioned the national 
Agrarian Reform Institute for title in 1970, 
and five years later, the land was declared 
“Property of the Nation” by then Mexican 
President Luis Echeverría. Perhaps that 
would have been the most interesting part 
of the story of Lomas de Poleo had the 
prominent Zaragoza family not claimed 
the land as its own. In 2002, it became 
clear that the land was in a key geographic 
location for the western expansion of Ciu-
dad Juárez and its sister city in the United 
States, El Paso. With much money to be 
made and only Lomas de Poleo in the way, 
the neighborhood has been at the center of 
major human rights violations committed 
by the Zaragozas, the local Juárez govern-
ment, and the Mexican government.
Much has been written about the strug-
gles of the people of Lomas de Poleo. 
Their grievances are too numerous to list, 
but include having their neighborhood 
surrounded by barbed wire and guard 
towers, their privately installed electricity 
and water systems destroyed, their homes 
bulldozed and burned (some with children 
inside), and residents beaten, harassed, 
shot, and intimidated. The local govern-
ment and police force have done nothing 
to stop the death and destruction, and but 
for the involvement of international human 
rights groups and brave attorneys, the last 
twenty or so families of the 400 who once 
lived there would likely be dead or gone. 
Instead, with the assistance provided by the 
Mexican human rights law firm Tierra y 
Libertad and lawyers like Barbara Zamora 
and Digna Ochoa, the people of Lomas de 
Poleo have sought official recognition of 
their ownership of the land. Their claim is 
now before the Ciudad Chihuahua Agrar-
ian Tribunal, and after years of delay and 
stall tactics, it appears that the Tribunal 
may soon rule in favor of the remaining 
families.
Still, on what seems to be the eve of 
victory, the violence shows no signs of 
abating. On December 4, 2009, Adelaida 
Plasencia Sierra, a resident of Lomas de 
Poleo, was shot in the doorway of her 
home after two masked men came asking 
for gasoline. The police labeled the event a 
“common robbery attempt” although noth-
ing was stolen and the men never entered 
her house. This latest, seemingly random 
act of violence shows that even in the face 
of defeat in the Tribunal, the community, 
police, and the mayor of Ciudad Juárez 
continue to accommodate and embolden 
the Zaragozas. As the families of Lomas 
de Poleo are either intimidated or enticed 
away from the area, time is clearly on the 
Zaragozas’ side. If the international human 
rights community fails to keep pressure 
on the situation, there will be no families 
left to defend the community’s legal rights. 
Few cases so well demonstrate the truth 
of the adage, “Justice delayed is justice 
denied.”
Haiti’s vuLneRaBLe cHiLDRen 
afteR tHe eaRtHQuake
In the days after the devastating Janu-
ary 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) issued 
warnings about the dangers that Haitian 
children would face as aid pours in and the 
nation tries to rebuild. Ironically, though 
much of that danger comes from the devas-
tation caused by the earthquake, some of it 
comes as a by-product of the humanitarian 
efforts that seek to help those very chil-
dren. With little governmental oversight 
and regulation before the earthquake, the 
destruction of nearly every government 
office in Port-au-Prince almost certainly 
means there will be even less protection 
for children, at least in the near future. 
Under the cover of the enormous amount 
of unregulated and unmonitored humani-
tarian work, child exploitation and traffick-
ing may explode beyond what was already 
an endemic problem in Haiti. Perceiving 
this threat, officials in Haiti suspended 
all extra-national adoption activities, even 
those approved prior to the earthquake.
Anecdotal evidence of this danger is 
already coming to light. Children have 
reportedly been offered for sale and kid-
napped from hospitals in the weeks since 
the earthquake. The most sensational inci-
dent involving Haitian children occurred 
on February 4, when ten American Baptist 
missionaries were charged with “criminal 
association” and “kidnapping” for attempt-
ing to bring 33 Haitian children across the 
border to the Dominican Republic. They 
had no official papers for the children, 
many of whom were not even orphans, 
but rather were handed over by parents or 
relatives who believed they would have 
better lives outside Haiti. The American 
missionaries were reportedly warned by 
Dominican officials that without proper 
documentation, they could be detained and 
charged with child trafficking. While all 
ten were initially charged at their February 
4 hearing, the Haitian judge ordered eight 
of them released on February 17.
The American missionaries and their 
actions represent the confusing collision 
of the humanitarian aid that the country 
so desperately needs with the question-
able and destructive practice of speedy 
child adoption that has led to repeated and 
widespread violations of children’s rights 
in Haiti. Prosecuting the Americans to the 
fullest extent would have sent a message 
that anyone wishing to adopt a Haitian 
child must follow the local laws, possibly 
preventing some confusion for parents 
wishing to put their children up for adop-
tion. However, such a message would be 
unlikely to address the underlying issues 
facing Haitian children, nor would it dis-
suade child traffickers who prey on Haitian 
children using less overt channels than the 
American missionaries. Ideally, the arrest 
of the Americans was not just an attempt at 
setting an example, but an instance of the 
government and judicial system working to 
protect its people and its children in ways 
that have been elusive in the past.
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stiLL castRo’s cuBa?
It has been nearly three and a half years 
since Fidel Castro first delegated his powers 
to his brother, First Secretary of the Cuban 
Communist Party Raúl Castro. Though 
initially temporary, the transfer of power 
became permanent in February 2008 when 
Raúl Castro officially became President 
of Cuba. The new President Castro began 
his tenure with some welcome reforms, 
such as allowing greater cell phone use, 
permitting the purchase of consumer elec-
tronics, and allocating unused government 
land for private use. While these reforms 
have given previously unheard-of free-
doms to the people of Cuba, they do not 
address the greater human rights issues 
endemic to the country. One major reform 
now possible for Cuba is to rejoin the 
Inter-American human rights system. The 
General Assembly of the Organization of 
American States (OAS) passed a resolu-
tion in June 2009, lifting the 47-year-old 
ban on Cuba’s participation and allowing 
Cuba to begin the process of becoming a 
fully functioning member state. With no 
outside venue for addressing human rights 
violations in Cuba, full membership in the 
OAS would allow its citizens access to at 
least one level of supranational review, the 
Inter-American human rights system.
Over seven months have passed since 
the General Assembly removed the ban, 
and Cuba has made no sign of interest in 
participating in the OAS. Further, after 
two years of Raúl Castro’s administra-
tion, it is ever clearer what the future of 
human rights in Cuba will be under his 
rule. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and 
the Cuban Commission for Human Rights 
and National Reconciliation issued their 
2009 reports on the state of human rights 
in Cuba. Both reports note that the number 
of political dissidents imprisoned in the 
country has fallen over the past two years, 
from nearly 300 to just above 200 today. 
The reports also note that the number of 
people on death row in Cuba has dropped 
sharply. Still, as the reported number of 
jailed dissidents falls, the reported inci-
dents of harassment and abuse continue 
to rise. The HRW report directly criticizes 
Raúl Castro’s continuation of his brother’s 
policies: “The government continues to 
enforce political conformity using criminal 
prosecutions, long- and short-term deten-
tions, mob harassment, surveillance, police 
warnings, and travel restrictions.”
The arrest of human rights activist 
Jorge Luís García Pérez, best known as 
“Antúnez,” and his wife on January 19, 
2010 while they were working to organize 
an independent library in Santiago de Cuba 
province. is a reminder of the continued 
repressive tactics of Castro’s Cuba. Antúnez 
and his wife were released on January 21 
without any formal charges filed against 
them. Antúnez has been detained briefly 
many times since his release from prison 
in April 2007 after 17 years as a political 
prisoner. Such treatment begs the question 
of whether short detentions will replace 
long ones as the new Castro regime’s 
harassment of choice. Furthermore, with 
no venue like the Inter-American system 
to challenge such treatment, Antúnez has 
little legal recourse.
Time will reveal whether Raúl Castro 
will depart from more of his brother’s poli-
cies. Ultimately, becoming an active mem-
ber in the OAS again is a necessary reform 
for Cuba; doing so would give activists like 
Antúnez a legal voice where one is needed 
most. Whatever Raúl Castro may say pub-
licly about Cuba fully participating in the 
OAS, the international community should 
not abandon the effort of pressuring Cuba 
to do so. At the very least, thanks to the 
General Assembly’s Resolution, the choice 
is now Cuba’s to make.
Evan Wilson, a J.D. candidate at the Wash-
ington College of Law, covered North 
America and the Caribbean for this issue 
of the Human Rights Brief.
latin ameriCa
a BaLancing act: tRenDs in Latin 
ameRican meDia Laws
Both Argentina and Venezuela have 
media laws that seek to prevent small 
groups of private companies from control-
ling media outlets and to foster public sup-
port for the government. Such laws may 
be justified given the countries’ history 
with coup d’états and corporate influence 
over the media. Nevertheless, the laws’ 
severe restrictions have, in some instances, 
amounted to censorship. Meanwhile, 
Bolivia is considering similar reforms to 
its laws.
On its face, Venezuela’s 2004 Social 
Responsibility Law appears to pursue legit-
imate governmental aims. The law requires 
every station to air at least seven hours of 
national programming a day, which may 
include cultural and educational shows. 
Four of the seven hours must be produced 
by national companies or organizations. 
Moreover, the law indicates the number of 
times a day that media stations must play 
the national anthem. Regulations like these 
are meant to foster support for the national 
government by ensuring that the public 
hears significant amount of programs that 
portray the government and country in a 
positive light.
Opponents to the law argue that it 
hinders freedom of expression. The law 
provides for harsh penalties for non-com-
pliance, including confiscation of airtime 
and imposition of fines. Further, it pro-
hibits any reference to violence, illegal 
activity, or political uprising. Finally, in 
January 2010 President Hugo Chavez used 
the law to take six stations off air, includ-
ing Radio Caracas Television International 
(RCTV), Venezuela’s largest private media 
source. RCTV is known to be highly anti-
Chavez and supported the 2002 coup d’état 
attempt against the President. Chavez justi-
fied taking RCTV off air by saying it did 
not broadcast the entirety of his lengthy 
speeches as required by the Social Respon-
sibility Law.
Similarly, in December 2009 Argen-
tine legislators passed the Audio-Visual 
Communications Law with the goal of 
diversifying the types of entities that own 
the media. The law requires that private 
companies, the government, and civil soci-
ety each control one third of radio and 
television channels in order to encourage 
broader local participation and to diversify 
broadcasting. The United Nations has been 
supportive of the initiative, calling it the 
“democratization” of Argentina’s media 
by making broadcasting accessible to a 
broader range of society.
Although the law has not yet come into 
force, it seems to regulate broadcasting 
through different means than the Ven-
ezuelan law. Whereas the Venezuelan law 
explicitly prohibits the broadcast of any-
thing anti-government and pro-violence, 
the Argentine law, by redistributing control 
of the channels, limits previously exist-
ing stations from broadcasting to their 
full extent. For example, if a private sta-
tion previously controlled forty percent of 
channels, and under the new law controls 
only a third, some of its programs must be 
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taken off the air. While promoting demo-
cratic principles through greater social 
participation in the media, the Argentine 
law provides the government with more 
regulatory power over the national media 
than it has previously had.
A third country, Bolivia, may also 
reform its media laws. During his reelec-
tion acceptance speech in September 2009, 
Bolivian President Evo Morales announced 
that he is considering new media laws that 
would redistribute control of broadcasting 
channels so that corporations do not own 
all of the channels. As Latin American 
governing parties try to foster national sup-
port, they are strategically turning to media 
outlets to help gather support, while also 
trying to ensure that the media is not used 
against them.
These regulatory trends in Latin Amer-
ica show efforts to democratize the media 
and make it accessible to groups outside of 
the powerful media corporations, but the 
regulations might at times come close to 
censorship. The right to freedom of expres-
sion is protected and prior censorship is 
prohibited by Article 13 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, with an 
exception for material that might pose a 
threat to national security or incite law-
lessness or war. Emerging Latin American 
media regulatory laws should be checked 
against the American Convention on 
Human Rights to ensure that government 
regulations do not interfere with the free-
dom of expression.
activists in Latin ameRica make 
PRogRess on gay maRRiage
In December 2009, gay rights activ-
ists in Mexico and Argentina took steps 
to uphold the rights of same-sex cou-
ples. Mexico City’s legislative assembly 
voted to change the definition of marriage, 
while in Argentina an official from Tierra 
del Fuego Province officiated over Latin 
America’s first same-sex marriage even 
after a national judge filed an injunction 
prohibiting the couple from marrying in 
Buenos Aires.
Activists in each country have taken dif-
ferent approaches to the struggle for mar-
riage equality. In Argentina the struggle 
began in the courts, while in Mexico City 
activists went directly to the legislature. 
Notwithstanding this strategic difference, 
the question of gay marriage has sparked 
similar debates in both countries: both are 
predominantly Roman Catholic and strug-
gle with whether gay marriage is moral.
The saga in Argentina began in Novem-
ber 2009 when Judge Gabriela Seijas from 
the Buenos Aires State Court declared the 
civil code unconstitutional and ordered 
the civil registry to grant Alejandro Freyre 
and José María di Bello a marriage license 
if they sought one. Specifically, Seijas 
declared Article 172 of the national civil 
code, which defines marriage as an agree-
ment between a “man and a woman,” 
unconstitutional. She reasoned that the 
Argentine Constitution does not define 
marriage as a contract between a man 
and a woman and that Article 11 of the 
Buenos Aires Constitution, which prohib-
its discrimination based on gender, made 
gender-based restrictions on marriage in 
the national civil code unconstitutional.
Shortly after Seijas issued her judg-
ment, lawyers from Buenos Aires sought 
an injunction before national Judge Marta 
Gómez Alsina that would prevent Freyre 
and di Bello from marrying in Buenos 
Aires. Gómez disagreed with Seija’s inter-
pretation of the civil code, opining that 
determinations on the legality of marriage 
should be left to the legislature and issued 
the injunction as a precautionary measure 
because she claimed that Seija did not 
have the authority — as a member of the 
judiciary — to change the national civil 
code. Gómez argued that the ability to alter 
the civil code is a legislative action that 
remains exclusively with the national con-
gress. Seija noted in her opinion, however, 
that her decision did not affect Argentina 
as a whole, but only the people of Buenos 
Aires, where her court has jurisdiction.
Activists in Mexico City, on the other 
hand, took a legislative rather than a judi-
cial approach. Representatives voted in 
December 2009 to change the city’s civil 
code, which previously defined marriage 
as a union between a man and a woman, 
to simply defining marriage as a union 
between two people. Despite opposition 
from the Catholic Church, lawmakers in 
Mexico City passed this and other pro-
gressive legislation, including a bill legal-
izing abortion during the first trimester of 
pregnancy.
Mexico’s left-wing Party of the Demo-
cratic Revolution (PRD) led the legislative 
assembly in revising the civil code by a 
vote of 39 to 20 with five abstentions. 
Opposition party leaders from the National 
Action Party (PAN), President Calderon’s 
party, say they will contest the revision. 
The statute only applies to marriage within 
Mexico City. None of Mexico’s states have 
passed similar amendments to their civil 
codes.
Although harder to achieve, Mexico 
City’s legislation assures same-sex couples 
the right to marry, whereas attempting to 
legalize gay-marriage through a judicial 
opinion has had disappointing results in 
Argentina. The legislative approach codi-
fies the right to same-sex marriage and 
makes it a right for all. Mexico City’s bold 
action should be commended and taken as 
an example by its neighbors throughout the 
Americas.
Tracey Begley, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers Latin 
America for the Human Rights Brief.
SuB-Saharan afriCa
Botswana’s oLDest ResiDents 
may ResoRt to icJ, cLaiming 
goveRnment is fLouting tHeiR 
LegaLLy PRotecteD RigHt to 
tRiBaL LanDs
The Bushmen are the oldest inhabit-
ants of sub-Saharan Africa, with ancestors 
dating back some 20,000 years. Despite 
their constitutionally protected right to 
live and hunt on the Central Kalahari 
Game Reserve (CKGR), the government 
of Botswana continues to deny the Bush-
men the right to access water and hunt on 
the land.
On January 18, 2010, Roy Sesana, leader 
of the First People of the Kalahari, declared 
that peace talks with Botswana’s president 
Ian Khama were unsuccessful and that the 
Bushmen are ready to take their case to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). The 
ICJ has authority under the United Nations 
Charter to issue advisory opinions to states 
regarding human rights violations. In order 
to pursue such an advisory opinion, the UN 
Secretary-General or another authorized 
organization would have to file a request 
on behalf of the Bushmen. Sesana accuses 
the government of ignoring the 2006 High 
Court decision that granted the Bushmen 
the right to live, hunt, and access water on 
the CKGR. Attempts to resolve the conflict 
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in domestic courts have also failed, after 
the government violated the 2006 ruling 
and failed to comply with subsequent rul-
ings concerning livestock confiscation and 
hunting permits.
The Bushmen reside in the CKGR, 
which was created in 1961 to protect their 
traditional lands and to help preserve the 
wildlife. However, after diamonds were 
discovered on the reserve in the 1980s, 
major conflicts developed between the 
Bushmen and the government, which many 
claim has tried to clear the Bushmen off 
the land in order to allow diamond miners 
freer access. Land evictions in 1997, 2002, 
and 2005 pushed almost all the Bushmen 
on the Kalahari Reserve off their lands 
into resettlement camps. To force people to 
relocate, the government also dismantled 
the Mothomelo water borehole inside the 
CKGR and stopped delivering water to 
Bushmen who lived in more distant areas 
on the reserve. Without access to the bore-
hole or the water deliveries, the Bushmen 
could no longer survive on the CKGR.
In 2006, after the longest and most 
expensive court case in Botswana’s history, 
the split High Court ruled that the govern-
ment’s actions in evicting the Bushmen 
were “unlawful and unconstitutional” and 
ordered it to allow the Bushmen to return 
to their land and have access to water 
and hunting permits. The swing vote was 
delivered by Judge Mpaphi Phumaphi, 
who stated that stopping food rations and 
depriving the Bushmen of hunting licenses 
was equivalent to condemning them to 
“death by starvation.” The ruling ordered 
the government to comply with Article 14 
of Botswana’s constitution, which protects 
the Bushmen and allows them to live freely 
in the reserve.
Since the 2006 landmark decision, 
Botswana’s government has evaded the rul-
ing and made it almost impossible for the 
Bushmen to live peacefully in the reserve. 
Over fifty Bushmen have been arrested 
since the court ruling for attempting to 
hunt inside the reserve. Despite the court’s 
holding that Bushmen have a legally pro-
tected right to hunt inside the CKGR, 
Roy Blackbeard, the High Commissioner 
from Botswana to the United Kingdom, 
recently compared allowing the Bushmen 
to hunt for food to feed their families 
with allowing people to kill animals at 
the London National Zoo. Additionally, 
Dikgakgamatso Seretse, the Minister of 
Defense, Justice, and Security agreed that 
denying the Bushmen the ability to hunt 
was unconstitutional, but maintained that 
the Bushmen do not have automatic rights 
to hunt and must rather apply for permits. 
However, since 2001 the government has 
denied every Bushmen who has applied for 
a Special Game License to hunt.
Since the Bushmen returned to the 
CKGR after the 2006 ruling, the gov-
ernment has denied them access to the 
boreholes they previously used for water, 
forcing them to travel 300 miles to collect 
water for their communities. Of the Bush-
men who have been brave enough to return 
to their land, at least one person has died 
from dehydration. The government consis-
tently claims that its actions are based on 
environmental concerns and that boreholes 
should only be used for wildlife. However, 
a safari company was recently allowed 
to build a swimming pool on the reserve 
at a tourist lodge supposedly designed to 
give visitors a true “Bushman experience.” 
Tiffany and Co. is also partnering with 
the Botswana’s government to build new 
boreholes on the CKGR for the exclusive 
use of wildlife. Not only has the govern-
ment explicitly refused to let the Bushmen 
access these new boreholes, it has further 
denied the Bushmen the right to drill a 
borehole at their own expense. The govern-
ment has also said that Gem Diamonds, a 
company which is in the process of being 
approved for mining, will be able to drill 
boreholes to clean diamonds, a process that 
requires billions of gallons of water.
Water and access to the CKGR are 
crucial to the Bushmen’s survival and the 
continuation of their way of life. The gov-
ernment is flagrantly violating the ruling 
of its own judicial body by continuing to 
discriminate against the Bushmen and deny 
them access to water. It is now up to the 
international community to rebuke the gov-
ernment of Botswana and make it conform 
to its own law.
soutH afRican faRmeRs sue 
ZimBaBwean goveRnment oveR 
faRm seiZuRes
Three white South African farm own-
ers, Louis Fick, Michael Campbell, and 
Richard Etheredge, are poised to challenge 
Zimbabwe’s controversial land reform pro-
gram in South Africa’s High Court of Pre-
toria. The week of January 22, 2010, the 
civil rights group AfriForum filed papers 
on behalf of the farmers against Zimba-
bwe, challenging its defiance of a 2008 
Southern African Development Commu-
nity (SADC) decision that the Zimbabwean 
land reform program violated international 
law and was racially discriminatory. The 
case is scheduled to begin on February 23, 
2010 and could lead to the Zimbabwean 
government’s assets in South Africa being 
attached so that farm owners can recover 
some of their losses. The farmers’ attorney, 
Willie Spies, stated that if the case suc-
ceeds, it would set a precedent for other 
dispossessed farmers to claim damages for 
lost property in South African courts.
Since 2000, Zimbabwean president 
Robert Mugabe has implemented a land 
reform program that has displaced approxi-
mately 4,200 white farmers and affected 
up to 60,000 workers and their families. 
In late 2009, Zimbabwe and South Africa 
signed the Bilateral Investment Promo-
tion and Protection Agreements, which 
South African government officials prom-
ised would protect South African interests 
under the land seizure program. However, 
evictions have actually increased since the 
agreement was signed, with at least seven-
teen farms affected in January 2010 alone. 
So far, South African government officials 
have denied requests to use the agreement 
to protect their citizens’ property rights, 
stating that the agreement is unenforce-
able until it is ratified by the Zimbabwean 
parliament.
Section 16B of Zimbabwe’s constitu-
tion provides that “no compensation shall 
be payable” for land that is forcibly taken 
for agricultural settlement and land reor-
ganization. Even though SADC declared 
the provision illegal in 2008, the Zimba-
bwean government has continued to seize 
land without paying the former owners. 
On January 26, 2010, Justice Bharat Patel 
of Zimbabwe’s High Court declared that, 
while Zimbabwe would normally recog-
nize SADC judgments, this ruling directly 
contradicts Zimbabwe’s constitution and is 
unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
The violence and lawlessness of aggres-
sive land takeovers in Zimbabwe is alarm-
ing. At least eighteen people have been 
murdered during violent evictions since 
2000. As recently as December 2009, farm 
owner Don Stewart was strangled and 
burnt to death in his home. On January 12, 
2010, the Smit family was locked inside 
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their home for over a week without water 
or electricity while a mob, bussed to the 
farm by a government official, camped 
outside and demanded that that the fam-
ily give up its property. A November 2009 
report by a coalition of Zimbabwean agri-
cultural organizations claims that during 
land evictions, 65 percent of dispossessed 
farmers have been tortured according to 
the United Nations Convention against 
Torture definition.
Although many takeovers are orches-
trated by high-ranking officials in Mugabe’s 
government, the land evictions are contro-
versial even within the government. In 
April 2009, after a farm was seized and 
given to President Mugabe’s biographer, 
the Zimbabwean deputy prime minister, 
Arthur Mutambara, denounced the take-
over and demanded the farm be returned. 
Although his demands were disregarded 
and the former owners were chased off the 
land, Mutambara continued to argue that 
land takeovers scare off foreign investors 
and lead to economic instability.
Mutambara is not alone in contending 
that the economy has suffered because of 
land reform. The Commercial Farmers 
Union (CFU) claims the land reform pro-
gram has led to non-productivity of eighty 
percent of formally cultivated land, leading 
to a U.S. $12 billion loss in agricultural 
production over ten years. The United 
Nations Famine Early Warning System 
Network has also reported that between 
January and March of 2010, 2.2 million 
Zimbabweans may be in need of food 
assistance. CFU blames the food shortages 
on the dramatic decrease in food produc-
tion since the land takeovers began in 2000 
— a logical conclusion considering there 
has only been one drought since the initia-
tion of the land reform campaign.
Even if AfriForum wins the current liti-
gation in South Africa, evictions of com-
mercial farms are unlikely to stop: of the 
three hundred still operating in Zimbabwe, 
152 are already being targeted. However, 
the ruling could find Zimbabwean offi-
cials in contempt of South African law if 
they refused to appear in court or pay any 
judgments, and may provide dispossessed 
farmers with an avenue to receive compen-
sation for land that has been taken from 
them. Considering that the government 
ignored the SADC ruling and domestic 
court decisions, this may be the most effec-
tive remedy farmers can expect.
Caitlin Shay, a J.D. candidate at the Wash-
ington College of Law, covers Sub-Saharan 
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.
miDDle eaSt anD north afriCa
tuRkisH constitutionaL couRt 
Bans kuRDisH PoLiticaL PaRty, 
tuRkey’s LaRgest minoRity gRouP 
Loses its PoLiticaL voice
Thousands of protestors took to the 
streets in southeast Turkey after the Turkish 
Constitutional Court announced its deci-
sion to ban the Democratic Society Party 
(DTP) on December 11, 2009. The DTP 
was the only legally recognized pro-Kurd-
ish party in Turkey; Kurds make up about 
twenty percent of the Turkish population. 
Officers used pressurized water and gas 
bombs to quell the protests in the Hakkari 
Province which continued for days after the 
initial announcement. The DTP is the 27th 
political party to be banned by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court.
Along with banning the party, the Court 
also barred 37 party members from partici-
pating in politics for five years. It justified 
its decision by citing violations of the Law 
of the Political Parties and Articles 68 and 
69 of the Turkish constitution. These arti-
cles state that political parties shall be per-
manently dissolved if they are in conflict 
with the indivisible integrity of Turkey’s 
territory or incite citizens to commit crime. 
The Court accused the DTP of connections 
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 
a party that was banned and has since been 
considered a terrorist-separatist group by 
the Turkish government. The chairman of 
the Court, Hasim Kilic, stated that the 
party was banned because “it had become 
a focal point of the activities against the 
country’s integrity.”
This decision will harm recent efforts 
by the Turkish government to improve 
relations with the Kurdish community. As 
recently as November 2009, the first Turk-
ish Foreign Minister entered the Kurdish 
region of northern Iraq since the birth of 
the Republic, the government announced 
proposals to reduce the sentences of boys 
associated with the PKK, and members of 
the PKK offered themselves to the Turkish 
authorities as a symbol of peace. These 
were considered to be important steps 
in improving the Turkish government’s 
relationship with its considerable Kurd-
ish population. Prime Minister Erdogan 
criticized the Court’s ruling, arguing that 
individuals should be punished for their 
activities rather than entire political parties.
The Laws of the Political Parties and the 
Court’s trend of banning parties have also 
been extensively criticized by the Euro-
pean Union. Turkey has been vying for EU 
membership since 1987. The Venice Com-
mission on the Council of Europe and the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
both dictate that parties can only be banned 
for inciting violence. In the case of the 
DTP, there has been no evidence that any of 
its members have promoted violence in any 
of their political activities, which makes 
the Court’s decision in violation of Articles 
10 and 11 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, to which Turkey is party. 
The Court’s unanimous decision to ban the 
DTP not only threatens the possibility of 
Turkey’s EU membership but also allows 
for further violations of the freedom of 
expression and democracy.
gaZa cageD
On January 20, 2010, the UN Aid and 
Association for International Development 
Agencies called for the immediate opening 
of Gaza’s borders in light of the escalating 
crisis that threatens the area. In direct con-
travention to this request, Gaza’s borders 
will soon be further blocked. Early this 
year, Israel announced plans to build a wall 
on its southern border, and Palestinians 
protested the construction of another wall 
that Egypt has just begun to build on its 
Rafah border. With the completion of these 
two walls, Egypt and Israel will have effec-
tively caged off the Gaza strip, preventing 
Palestinians in Gaza from leaving and 
keeping out the supplies that are smuggled 
through the border.
It has been a year since Egypt was 
harshly criticized for closing its border 
to Palestinians desperate to escape dur-
ing Israel’s offensive against Gaza in the 
winter of 2008 to 2009; the construction of 
this wall is drawing the same kind of criti-
cisms. Egyptian officials have explained 
that the wall is necessary to defend Egypt’s 
national security, but it is widely under-
stood that the wall is intended to halt 
the smuggling that occurs underneath its 
borders every day. The steel wall is to run 
one hundred feet deep, blocking the esti-
mated 400 tunnels that run underneath the 
Egyptian-Gaza border.
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Israel too, for the purposes of national 
security, is building a wall on its southern 
border. In addition, Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu announced that the 
wall is intended to protect the “Jewish 
character of the state.” Thousands of Afri-
can migrants cross the border from Egypt 
into Israel every year, many of whom are 
asylum seekers, hailing from Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, and Sudan. The journey to Israel 
is often very perilous; seventeen African 
migrants have been ordered shot at the bor-
der by Egyptian security since May 2009.
These walls suggest the possibility of 
serious humanitarian problems. Once com-
pleted, the two walls will indirectly link 
up near Rafah, Egypt; it is speculated that 
eventually the whole Gaza strip will be sur-
rounded by one single wall. Caging in the 
Gaza strip will likely foster an explosive 
atmosphere among residents. There have 
already been casualties associated with the 
project, as violent protests have erupted 
along the site of the walls.
Since the Israeli blockade began in 
2007, Gazans have come to rely on the 
U.S. $1 million worth of goods smuggled 
through the tunnels every day. The block-
ade limits basic necessities like food, medi-
cal supplies, construction, and fuel from 
entering Gaza. With no other option, these 
same goods must be smuggled through the 
tunnels. The tunnels have helped deter a 
humanitarian crisis for those isolated on 
the 360 square kilometer strip. By blocking 
the tunnels, Egypt will be denying Pales-
tinians the goods they desperately need.
Further, the aim of these protective 
measures may fail to prevent and, instead, 
exacerbate the existing problems. Migrants 
are likely to continue trying to enter Israel 
through more perilous routes, and smug-
glers may try to construct deeper tunnels. 
Israel has international obligations under 
Articles 55 and 56 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention to ensure that residents in Gaza 
have access to food and medical supplies. 
With the construction of these walls, not 
only are Israel and Egypt evading their 
international obligations, but the walls may 
lead to more problems by forcing people 
to seek desperate schemes to obtain relief.
afteR Hesitation, iRaQ eLection 
Ban is ReinstateD
On February 13, 2010, Iraqi officials 
confirmed the decision by the Iraqi Justice 
and Accountability Commission to ban 
more than 500 individuals from participat-
ing in the March 7 elections. This decision 
quickly undermined the hope for free and 
democratic elections sparked when an Iraqi 
appeals court suspended the voting ban on 
February 3. Candidates had just three days 
to appeal the decision; only 177 actually 
exercised that right, and just 28 of them 
were granted permission to participate in 
the elections. The original ban, announced 
in January, was widely protested domesti-
cally and internationally. Most of those 
blacklisted come from the Sunni com-
munity, including fifteen political parties, 
popular Sunni politicians, and original 
drafters of the Iraqi constitution. The most 
recent confirmation of this decision may 
exacerbate the country’s unstable politi-
cal climate, which has been rocked with 
sectarian violence for the past seven years.
The constitutionality of the original ban 
is dubious. The standards that were used 
to bar participation were not transparent, 
and the commissioners involved had yet 
to be approved by the Iraqi parliament, 
as required by law. Beyond the domestic 
legality issue, Iraq has an international 
obligation under Article 25 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights to allow its citizens to freely elect 
their representatives. Most Sunni Arabs 
boycotted the parliamentary elections in 
2005. As a result, there is a dispropor-
tionately high representation of Shiite and 
Kurdish Iraqis in the Council of Represen-
tatives; approximately 35 percent of Iraqis 
are Sunni but they comprise less than 20 
percent of members of the Council of 
Representatives. Because of the boycott, 
many Sunni leaning electors did not have 
the opportunity to elect prominent Sunni 
candidates.
The Commission’s decision is an exten-
sion of its overall de-Baathification efforts. 
The policy, first promoted by U.S. admin-
istrator of Iraq Paul Bremer, was imple-
mented in an effort to erase all traces of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. Its initiatives 
included the dissolution of all branches of 
the Iraqi government that were Baathist in 
nature and the implementation Article 7 of 
the Iraq Constitution, which bars political 
parties that promote Baathism. Most of the 
candidates and parties that were banned 
had ties to the pre-2003 Baath party.
The de-Baathification process has been 
criticized by human rights proponents, who 
argue that it punishes individuals who were 
innocently associated with or obligated to 
join the Baath party. Not joining meant 
forfeiting basic employment, health, and 
education rights because the party was the 
political entity promoted by the authoritar-
ian government of Saddam Hussein. Most 
members were teachers and administrative 
figures with virtually no ties to Saddam 
Hussein or his politics. The ban further 
isolates Sunnis in an already polarized 
political system.
The March elections are considered 
a litmus test for the national reconcilia-
tion process. Since the announcement, a 
Sunni female suicide bomber killed 54 
and wounded 117 Shiites on pilgrimage in 
Iraq; most recently on February 3, another 
Sunni suicide bomber killed twenty Shia 
pilgrims. If recent events are an indicator 
for the future of reconciliation, the court’s 
decision may escalate the sectarian ten-
sions that already plague the country.
Shubra Ohri, a J.D. candidate at the Wash-
ington College of Law, covers North Africa 
and the Middle East for the Human Rights 
Brief.
europe
Russia PRomotes Justice By 
Ratifying PRotocoL 14 of 
euRoPean couRt of Human RigHts
With a vote of 392 to 56, Russia’s par-
liament, the Duma, ratified Protocol 14 
to the European Court on Human Rights 
(ECtHR) on January 15, 2010. The Proto-
col is part of a new set of reforms aimed to 
streamline the work of the ECtHR. Since 
2006, Russia has been the only state out 
of 47 in the Council of Europe (CoE) to 
oppose Protocol 14. The reforms are a 
response to the growing backlog of cases 
in the ECtHR, partly due to the ongoing 
ascension of Eastern European countries 
to the European Union. Although many of 
the reforms proposed by Protocol 14 have 
already been implemented by most of the 
CoE Member States through the adoption 
of an interim protocol last year, Russian 
late ratification allows the Court to imple-
ment faster and simpler procedures.
In 2006, President Vladimir Putin sent 
Protocol 14 to the Duma for review, but 
concerns over the Russian Federation’s 
national interest and sovereignty proved 
obstacles to ratification. According to 
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Aleksei V. Makarkin, a leading analyst at 
the Center for Political Technologies, a 
Moscow policy research group, Russia’s 
decision to ratify Protocol 14 was brought 
on by a change in atmosphere in the capi-
tal. Makarkin suggests that “[Russia] no 
longer [has] the feeling that Europe wants 
to build revolutions here.”
European ministers’ recognition of Rus-
sian complaints regarding the reforms also 
prompted Russia to ratify Protocol 14. One 
of the conditions set by Russia before rati-
fying the Protocol was a guarantee that one 
out of three judges presiding over cases at 
the ECtHR will be a national of the state 
against which the legal claim is brought. 
This means that at least one Russian judge 
will review complaints against the Fed-
eration. As a result of this compromise, 
the ECtHR cannot investigate complaints 
before cases are formally accepted by Rus-
sian judges, and the ECtHR could not adopt 
new powers to force the implementation of 
the court’s rulings. This compromise was 
needed because, without Russia’s accep-
tance of the reforms, the CoE was power-
less. However, no changes were made to 
the Protocol itself during the CoE’s nego-
tiations with Russia.
The implications of this ratification 
are numerous. First, it will streamline the 
workload encumbering the ECtHR. Up 
to this point, failure to ratify the Protocol 
meant that it took approximately four to 
five years to process a case, which is sig-
nificant given that one-third of the cases 
pending are either from Russia or implicate 
Russia in some way. Protocol 14 reforms 
aimed at simplifying the procedures of 
the Court include: screening applications 
through a national court before proceeding 
to the ECtHR, having one judge decide 
the admissibility of a case, and merging 
multiple complaints against the same state 
in certain circumstances. Although new 
procedures will not resolve all problems 
resulting from the flood of applications to 
the Court, they will promote efficiency.
Second, the ratification is an important 
step in strengthening the Court’s role in 
upholding human rights across Europe 
and providing all Europeans with better 
access to justice through the Court. Third, 
Protocol 14 enables the CoE Committee of 
Ministers to bring states before the ECtHR 
for failing to implement the Court’s judg-
ments. For this reason, ratification of the 
Protocol could force Russia to implement 
ECtHR judgments on abuses in Chechnya. 
In more than 115 rulings, the Court found 
Russian officials responsible for the disap-
pearances of human rights activists, extra-
judicial executions, and torture. Although 
Russia paid monetary compensation to the 
families of the victims, as required by the 
ECtHR, it failed to effectively investigate 
these crimes and hold the perpetrators 
criminally accountable.
For instance on July 15, 2009, the lead-
ing human rights activist in Chechnya, 
Natalia Estemirova, was kidnapped and 
murdered. Less than a month later, Zarema 
Sadulayeva and her husband Alik Dzhab-
railov, activists for the Save the Generation 
organization in Chechnya, were kidnapped 
from their office and found murdered the 
next day. In total, four Chechen human 
rights activists were killed in 2009, and 
their murders have yet to be effectively 
investigated and prosecuted. The ratifica-
tion of Protocol 14 brings hope that crimes 
in Chechnya will not go unpunished.
Finally, the Federation views this rati-
fication as a step toward improving the 
entire legal system in Russia. The poten-
tial overhaul of Russia’s legal system is 
also evidenced by the recent ratification 
of Protocol 13 of the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights, which implements 
a moratorium on the death penalty in the 
Federation. However, only time will tell if 
Russia will comply with the terms of the 
Protocol and will not use its negotiations 
with the CoE to thwart the justice system in 
Europe. Russia’s decision to ratify Protocol 
14 also comes on the eve of an important 
ministerial conference to discuss the future 
development of the Court, to be held in 
Interlaken, Switzerland, on February 18 
and 19, 2010.
LanDmaRk RenDition tRiaL in itaLy
In a landmark ruling on November 4, 
2009, Italy’s highest court gave verdicts 
on the 2003 abduction of Egyptian-born 
cleric Mustafa Osama Nasr, known as Abu 
Omar. On February 17, 2003, Nasr was 
abducted as part of an extraordinary ren-
dition operation between the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Italian 
Military Intelligence and Security Service 
(SISMI) while he was walking to a mosque 
in Milan, Italy. Under investigation by 
the Italian police, Nasr was suspected of 
recruiting militants for Iraq. The CIA flew 
Nasr to Egypt where they tortured him with 
electric shocks, beatings, genital abuse, 
and threats of rape. Although the Italian 
court issued indictments against the defen-
dants in June 2005, the case was slowed by 
the Prodi and Berlusconi administrations, 
which were concerned with maintaining 
friendly Italian-American relations.
Of the 26 CIA operatives tried in absen-
tia, 23 including U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. 
Joseph Romano were convicted by the 
Italian court, while three were protected by 
diplomatic immunity. Robert Seldon Lady, 
the CIA station chief in Milan at the time 
of the kidnapping, received an eight-year 
sentence, while 21 other former agents 
each received five years. The Milan court 
also found that two Italian officials were 
complicit in the CIA abuses and sentenced 
them to three years in prison. The court 
also ruled that those convicted must pay 
€1 million (U.S. $1.5 million) in dam-
ages to Abu Omar and €500,000 to his 
wife. The judge refrained from providing a 
verdict against five of the seven Italians on 
trial, as a result of a March 2009 ruling by 
the Italian Constitutional Court that inter-
preted the state secrecy doctrine to provide 
broad protections and served to block evi-
dence against them in the trial.
Joanna Mariner, Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism 
Director, criticized the United States and 
Italy for using the state secrecy doctrine to 
provide diplomatic immunity guarantees to 
government officials responsible for gross 
human rights abuses. Nevertheless, HRW 
stated that the verdicts “[mark] a historic 
legal challenge to the CIA’s rendition pro-
gram.” This is this first time CIA opera-
tives have faced a criminal trial for the use 
of extraordinary rendition, a controversial 
anti-terrorism program expanded by the 
George W. Bush administration. Accord-
ing to Italian prosecutor Armando Spataro, 
this verdict sends a clear message to all 
governments “that even in the fight against 
terrorism you can’t forsake the basic rights 
of our democracies.”
As all of the American defendants were 
tried in absentia, they are now consid-
ered fugitives under Italian law. Spataro 
confirmed that the American CIA opera-
tives are only subject to arrest in Europe, 
because the Italian government refused to 
send the request to arrest and to extradite 
the fugitives to Interpol or U.S. authorities.
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Most importantly, the verdicts call on 
the Obama administration to follow Italy’s 
lead in prosecuting other officials who 
were involved in the program. Although 
the Obama administration launched an 
investigation into the CIA’s abusive inter-
rogation techniques in 2009, it has not 
focused on the U.S. rendition program. 
The CIA has not commented on any of the 
allegations surrounding Abu Omar, and 
a spokesperson for the State Department 
said, “We are disappointed by the verdicts.” 
It is uncertain whether the CIA operatives 
have any recourse in the United States 
following their guilty verdicts in Italian 
court, since the Italian judge has ignored 
requests to move Lt. Col. Romano’s case 
to the United States. On the other hand, 
Sabrina De Sousa, an American defendant, 
sued the State Department in federal court 
for diplomatic immunity. In an American 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) inter-
view with Dan Ross, De Sousa acknowl-
edged that “[c]learly, we broke a law, and 
we’re paying for the mistakes right now of 
whoever authorized and approved this.” 
She then criticized the U.S. government, 
stating, “I was assigned as a representative 
of this Government, and I should have been 
protected.” She plans to amend her lawsuit 
to include Jeffrey Castelli, Robert Seldon 
Lady, and the CIA as defendants because 
they were responsible for the abduction. 
De Sousa denies involvement in Nasr’s 
rendition.
In light of the verdict dismissing a 
suit brought by Canadian rendition victim 
Maher Arar on November 2, 2009 by a 
U.S. federal appellate court in New York, 
the United States is unlikely to enforce 
the recent Italian ruling. However, the EU 
arrest warrants issued against the 22 defen-
dants renders them subject to the threat 
of arrest outside the United States for the 
rest of their lives. One thing is for certain: 
the outcome of the Italian court verdict 
increases pressure on the Obama adminis-
tration to re-evaluate its rendition program.
Annamaria Racota, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers Europe 
for the Human Rights Brief.
South anD Central aSia
BReaktHRougH foR eunucH RigHts 
in Pakistan
Eunuchs in Pakistan received much-
needed support from the unlikely source of 
the Pakistani Supreme Court, giving many 
hope for future improvements. In June 
2009, the Court ordered provincial govern-
ments to conduct a survey of all eunuchs 
in the country. The term eunuch, as used 
in most of South Asia, describes those who 
fall outside of socially-accepted sexual 
norms: intersexuals, transsexuals, gay men, 
and men who have not fully developed.
The Supreme Court’s move came after 
Dr. Mohammad Aslam Khaki filed a peti-
tion seeking to establish a commission to 
create greater equality for eunuchs and 
effeminate men who are generally treated 
harshly in Pakistani society. Dr. Khaki 
began advocating for better treatment of 
eunuchs after a police raid led to the 
arrest of several transvestites in Taxila, 
in Pakistan’s Punjab province. Dr. Khaki 
found the group’s living conditions to be 
among the worst of any minority group 
in the country and that most eunuchs in 
Pakistan make their living through danc-
ing, begging, and prostitution. According 
to the petition, parents of transvestite or 
transgender children commonly give them 
to eunuch leaders, who train them in one 
of these occupations. The petition also 
detailed the social hardships many eunuchs 
face: living in slums; denial of basic civil 
rights such as inheritance; and exclusion 
from public facilities and transportation. 
Many eunuchs also experience physical 
and financial abuse from gangsters, police, 
and even their own families.
The court-ordered survey required the 
social welfare departments of provincial 
governments to gather information, includ-
ing the population of eunuchs in Pakistan, 
the status of facilities available to them, the 
nature of offenses committed against them 
as children, and the reasons parents are 
giving them up at birth. The detailed results 
were compiled in a report submitted to the 
Supreme Court.
In July 2009, after reviewing the 
requested report and hearing the testimony 
of eunuch witnesses, the Supreme Court 
ruled that eunuchs are entitled to the same 
benefits and protections available to all 
Pakistani citizens. The Court ordered the 
provincial governments to ensure their 
security, work to curtail police abuse, and 
offer them provincial financial aid pro-
grams and NGO welfare programs. The 
Court showed compassion for the plight 
of the Pakistani eunuchs, who live what it 
considered “a life of shame.” The Justices 
also lamented the discrimination practiced 
by parents against their own children.
In November 2009, the Supreme Court 
held a hearing to review the implementa-
tion of the July decision. At the hearing, 
the Court directed the Pakistani federal and 
provincial governments to hold meetings to 
determine how to fulfill the requirements 
of the ruling. During the hearing, Chief 
Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry sug-
gested possible mechanisms to address 
the issues facing eunuchs, including a 
job quota system and the involvement of 
federal agencies such as the National Data-
base and Registration Authority (NADRA). 
The Chief Justice also suggested a meet-
ing between representatives of provincial 
governments, the federal government, and 
NGOs as the next step in resolving the 
problem.
After the provinces were given time to 
comply with these directives, the Supreme 
Court issued a final order in mid-Decem-
ber that identified eunuchs as a distinct 
gender. The order also established that 
eunuchs are entitled to their inherited 
property and assigned Pakistan’s Social 
Welfare Department to oversee the task. 
In addition to other reforms, the Elec-
tion Commission was directed to register 
eunuchs in electoral rolls.
The Court’s orders are yet to be fully 
implemented, but the support of the 
Supreme Court is a welcome change to the 
ostracization eunuchs have faced for years. 
It is an important victory and a chance for 
a better future for the eunuch community 
of Pakistan.
ReLease of cHiLD soLDieRs: a 
gooD sign foR tHe nePaLese Peace 
PRocess
The ten-year conflict between Maoist 
rebels and the government of Nepal, which 
ended in 2006, resulted in many human 
rights abuses, not the least among them 
the use of child soldiers by the Maoist 
rebels. According to human rights orga-
nizations, Maoists forcibly took children 
from schools and persuaded them to fight 
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against the government during the civil 
war.
In early January 2010, 155 former child 
soldiers were released as civilians after 
three years in UN-monitored detention 
camps. These were the first of over 24,000 
former Maoist fighters to be discharged 
under the 2006 agreement, including 3,000 
minor combatants and another 1,035 who 
helped the Maoists in non-combatant roles. 
By February 8, 2010, a total of 2,394 for-
mer child soldiers were released. Unlike 
their adult counterparts who are to be 
incorporated into the national military, for-
mer child soldiers who were under the age 
of eighteen in 2006 were released to their 
families and received rehabilitation pack-
ages that provide them with the opportu-
nity to attend school or to learn new trades. 
Their progress will be monitored by the 
United Nations.
The discharge of former Maoist child 
soldiers from detention camps is part of 
an action plan agreed to in December 
2009 by the United Nations, the Nepalese 
government, and the Unified Communist 
Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M). Once 
the former child soldiers are released, 
the UCPN-M will be removed from the 
Secretary-General’s list of child soldier 
recruiters.
The move is a momentous one in fur-
thering the Nepalese peace process, which 
reached a standstill in November 2009 
after Maoists protested the president’s pow-
ers concerning the army. The UCPN-M 
had originally refused the rehabilitation 
plan, demanding financial packages for 
the minors instead of educational and voca-
tional training. The government refused 
to alter the plan, however, fearing that 
financial benefits would end up fund-
ing the People’s Liberation Army, aiding 
them in recruiting former child soldiers 
to join them instead of returning home. 
After November’s tension, the UN envoy to 
Nepal cited the release of the child soldiers 
as an optimistic sign in the peace process.
The UN mandate responsible for facili-
tating negotiations thus far was to end 
on January 23, 2010, but was extended 
through May 15, 2010. The enormous task 
of reintegration of former rebels, coupled 
with the drafting of the national constitu-
tion and preparation for the elections to 
follow, was presented to the UN Security 
Council as evidence that Nepal needs addi-
tional help from the United Nations. The 
release of child soldiers was just the first 
of many steps necessary to ensure that the 
peace process continues. Despite the initia-
tion of the former child soldiers’ rehabilita-
tion programs, there is no guarantee that 
the peace process would continue without 
further UN assistance.
Devout aZeRBaiJani viLLageRs 
aRResteD afteR ReLigious 
ceRemony
More than a hundred Azerbaijani villag-
ers were arrested in the village of Bananyar 
in the Nakhchivan enclave on January 5, 
2010. Initially, several arrests reportedly 
took place the day after the Day of Ashura, 
on which Shia Muslims mourn the death 
of Muhammad’s grandson, in late Decem-
ber 2009. These detentions were allegedly 
a reaction to the villagers’ performance 
of ritual mourning practices on Ashura. 
Those detained were subjected to interro-
gations and physical abuse by local secu-
rity forces. Their detention inspired strong 
protests from family members, including 
one young man who set himself on fire in 
an attempt to free his relatives.
After the initial arrest of several Ashura 
participants, security forces returned dur-
ing the night of January 5 and violently 
arrested others thought to be responsible 
for organizing the ceremony. The prisoners 
were taken to the Interior Ministry head-
quarters and a pretrial detention center to 
be questioned. Almost all of the prisoners 
were released within a week of the arrests; 
a few, however, were held in mental insti-
tutions and jails within the Nakhchivan 
enclave.
Initially, the Nakhchivan Interior Min-
ister denied the allegations of arrests, but 
later admitted that arrests had been made. 
The Minister blamed the opposition, the 
Popular Front Party, and a mentally ill 
villager for the trouble. Nakhchivan offi-
cials claimed that the young man who set 
himself on fire was mentally ill and was 
provoked by villagers, led by the leader of 
the Popular Front Party, to threaten suicide 
if closed kiosks were not reopened. Mean-
while, the head of the pretrial detention 
center denied that any villagers were held 
at his facility.
Less than one week after the clashes 
between security forces and villagers led to 
these arrests, Norwegian and U.S. Embassy 
officials were not allowed into the Banan-
yar village on a fact-finding trip. The trip 
was halted by a group of neighboring vil-
lagers, allegedly organized by Nakhchivan 
enclave authorities to deter the officials’ 
progress. Azerbaijani human rights groups 
also requested official permission to enter 
the area, but did not receive a response 
from Nakhchivan authorities. Officials 
from the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were able 
to meet with activists in Baku, however, to 
evaluate the situation.
The United States joined Norway on 
January 14 in encouraging Azerbaijani 
officials to investigate the events that led 
to the detention of Shia Muslim worship-
pers. The joint statement, signed by the 
two countries also expressed objections 
to the access to Bananyar during their 
fact-finding trip. Azerbaijan has already 
been repeatedly accused of persecuting 
devout Muslims, a practice which rights 
groups attribute to the government’s fear of 
Islamic influence in the country.
According to Human Rights Watch, new 
laws instated in the last year in Azerbai-
jan are furthering restrictions on freedom 
of conscience and religion. These laws 
include a requirement that each religious 
organization register with the government 
and conduct its activities solely at its legal 
address. In addition, organizations need 
express permission from a government 
agency, the State Committee for Work 
with Religious Organizations, to publish 
literature, and the organizations can only 
be headed by Azerbaijani citizens educated 
in the country. These restrictions violate 
the norms of freedom of religion and 
conscience practiced by other states in the 
OSCE and the Council of Europe; Azerbai-
jan is a Member State of both. Azerbaijan 
has come under increasing scrutiny for 
restricting multiple basic freedoms; hope-
fully the events in the Nakhchivan enclave 
are not a harbinger of more abuses to come.
Bhavani Raveendran, a J.D. candidate at 
the Washington College of Law, covers 
South and Central Asia for the Human 
Rights Brief.
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eaSt aSia
uigHuR PRotesteRs sentenceD  
to DeatH
China’s far western Xinjiang province, 
rich in oil and gas deposits, is home to the 
Uighurs, one of China’s minority groups. 
Representing less than one percent of 
China’s total population but about forty 
percent of the inhabitants of Xinjiang, the 
Uighurs speak a Turkic language and are 
predominately Muslim. The Uighurs have 
continuously called for the region’s inde-
pendence, referring to Xinjiang as “East 
Turkistan” or “Uighuristan.” The Chinese 
government, however, relies on the One 
China Policy and opposes the region’s 
autonomy, labeling the Uighurs as “anti-
China forces.”
During the last few decades, a growing 
population of Han Chinese, the majority 
ethnic group in China, has moved into the 
area, causing disruption and insecurity 
in the Uighur community. The Uighurs 
viewed the newcomers as a threat to their 
jobs and traditional way of life, attempting 
to crowd the Uighurs out of the region. 
Before this influx of Han residents, more 
than ninety percent of Xinjiang’s popula-
tion was Uighur.
Tensions between Han Chinese and the 
Uighurs, who had long complained of Chi-
nese government’s repression, erupted into 
deadly riots on July 5, 2009 in Urumqi, 
the capital of Xinjiang province. Peaceful 
demonstrations in reaction to the brutal 
murders of two Uighur migrants working 
in China’s Guangdong province in June 
2009 escalated into a violent clash. While 
the Uighurs argue that the police trig-
gered the violence by responding harshly 
to peaceful protests, Han Chinese allege 
that Uighurs first attacked Han Chinese 
and vandalized their shops. Official fig-
ures from the Chinese government reflect 
at least 197 dead and more than 1,600 
injured. However, Uighur exile groups 
argue that Chinese police shot or beat to 
death about 800 people.
The July riots forced many Uighurs to 
leave the region and they have since been 
issued “Persons of Concern” letters by the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees. 
However, some remained in the region, 
and over 1,000 people who allegedly par-
ticipated in the violence were detained. As 
of January 2010, 26 of those detained were 
sentenced to death and at least nine of these 
death sentences had been carried out.
Human rights groups and members of 
the international community have con-
demned these executions, claiming that the 
suspects were denied due process rights 
and that the use of the death penalty far 
exceeds international standards. Motivated 
to impose political pressure on dissidents, 
the Chinese government executed partici-
pants in the riots for “violent crimes of 
attacking, smashing, looting and burning.” 
Article 6 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) limits 
the imposition of death sentences to the 
“most serious crimes;” most countries that 
utilize the death penalty impose it only for 
very serious crimes such as murder, rape or 
terrorism. China, however, has long been 
the target of criticism for giving suspects 
a “political verdict” and using the death 
penalty as a tool for threatening those who 
challenge social harmony.
Due to a lack of transparency in Chi-
na’s legal system, questions remain as to 
whether the accused had fair trials. While 
the spokesperson for Xinjiang’s regional 
government maintains that the media and 
the family members of the accused had 
access to the trials, Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) contends that the trials were neither 
publicly announced nor open to the public 
and that the defendants were given less 
than one day’s notice of the date of their 
trials. HRW further alleges that the trials of 
those involved in the July violence do not 
meet “minimum standards for the admin-
istration of justice” because the Chinese 
government threatened lawyers who began 
independently investigating the violence, 
denying suspects access to legal represen-
tation of their choice.
The lack of transparency in the trials of 
those sentenced to death for participation 
in the July demonstrations violates both 
international and domestic standards of due 
process. Under China’s criminal procedural 
law, a suspect has the right to be appointed 
a defender for both publicly and privately 
prosecuted cases. Also, the ICCPR states 
that “[a]ll persons . . . before the courts and 
tribunals . . . shall be entitled to a fair and 
public hearing . . . .” Although China has 
signed but not ratified the ICCPR, Chinese 
law incorporates the internationally recog-
nized principle of open trials established 
by the ICCPR. Moreover, according to 
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT), as a signatory 
to the ICCPR, China is “obliged to refrain 
from acts which would defeat the object 
and purpose” of the ICCPR. China has 
not ratified the VCLT; although many of 
the provisions of the VCLT are considered 
customary international law and therefore 
binding on all states, it remains unclear 
whether this includes Article 18. To come 
into compliance with its treaty obligations 
and widely-accepted international legal 
norms, China should afford fair trials to all 
suspects involved in the July riots, regard-
less of their actual or suspected status as 
political dissidents.
soutH koRea gRants Refugee 
status to gay Pakistani asyLum 
seekeR
Due in part to the strong cultural influ-
ence of Confucianism, South Korea is a 
conservative society with a generally nega-
tive public perception of homosexuality. It 
was not until 2000, when Korean celebrity 
Seok-cheon Hong publicly announced that 
he was gay, that the public began to actively 
discuss LGBT issues. Despite such societal 
changes as greater recognition and under-
standing of gays and lesbians, homosexual-
ity in South Korea, as in many other Asian 
countries, is still viewed as unusual and 
unwelcome.
Recently, however, the Seoul Admin-
istrative Court granted refugee status to a 
gay man facing persecution in Pakistan for 
his sexual orientation. He fled from Paki-
stan to Korea in 1996 after family members 
threatened to report his sexual orientation 
to the police; he lived illegally in Korea 
until he was caught last year by the agents 
of the Korean Immigration Bureau. He 
filed a petition for refugee status in Febru-
ary 2009, which was denied by the Minis-
try of Justice four months later. The Seoul 
Administrative Court overturned the ruling 
on the grounds that it is highly likely that 
“the plaintiff will be subject to persecution 
by the Pakistani government” if repatri-
ated. Under the Pakistani Penal Code, “car-
nal intercourse against the order of nature” 
is a crime punishable by a fine and possible 
imprisonment of two years to life.
The Administrative Court’s decision has 
generated a debate among South Kore-
ans. Since it is the first time in Korean 
history that sexual orientation has been 
used as a basis for granting refugee status, 
some question its legitimacy. South Korea 
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became a State Party to the 1951 Conven-
tion relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Convention) and the 1967 Pro-
tocol in 1992. Since then, 2,413 foreigners 
have applied for refugee status in South 
Korea. Only 145 applicants have been 
granted asylum for racial, religious, and 
political reasons.
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Conven-
tion defines a refugee as a person who, 
“owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted,” cannot return to his own coun-
try. Moreover, Article 1A(2) lists several 
grounds for persecution for which refugees 
may be granted asylum: race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion. A par-
ticular social group is defined as a group 
of people who share common immutable 
characteristics other than risk of persecu-
tion, such as background, customs, or 
social status. States such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Neth-
erlands, Germany, and Sweden have for 
some time accepted asylum claims based 
on an individual’s sexual orientation as a 
basis for membership in a particular social 
group. These countries, among others, have 
found that granting asylum on the grounds 
of sexual orientation is in compliance with 
the Refugee Convention.
Although the South Korean Supreme 
Court must review the Administrative 
Court’s holding before refugee status 
will be granted, this decision is the first 
acknowledgment of sexual orientation as 
a valid basis for accepting asylum seekers 
in South Korea, and reflects the changing 
attitudes of South Korean society towards 
gays and lesbians.
cHiLD aBDuction By PaRents  
in JaPan
On January 30, 2010, ambassadors 
from the United States and seven Western 
nations met with Japanese Foreign Minis-
ter Katsuya Okada to urge Japan to address 
its child custody issues; the current Japa-
nese system enables parents who abduct 
their children and interferes with the abil-
ity of divorced foreign parents to see their 
children in Japan. International parental 
child abduction occurs when a marriage 
between nationals of different states fails 
and one parent takes the child to another 
country or detains the child in violation of 
a custody or visitation order without the 
consent of the other parent. In some cases, 
the parent who is left behind cannot visit 
the child because laws in the country where 
the child has been taken provide protec-
tions to the abductors.
In most countries, divorced par-
ents make a child custody arrangement, 
detailing their legal rights over their chil-
dren, including visitation and custodial 
rights and responsibilities. Such custodial 
arrangements, however, are unenforceable 
in Japan, where the country’s Family Code 
only recognizes sole custody and does not 
provide visitation rights for noncustodial 
parents. Divorced Japanese parents can 
bring their children to Japan in violation of 
custody or visitation arrangements made 
in a foreign country and face no repercus-
sions. If the abducting spouse refuses to 
have contact with their former spouse, the 
foreign parent ultimately loses access to 
his or her children. As a result, some critics 
have called Japan an “international haven 
for child abduction.” Moreover, activist 
groups such as the Assembly for French 
Overseas Nationals for Japan estimate that 
as many as 10,000 children with dual citi-
zenship in Japan are unable to contact their 
foreign parents.
As international marriages and divorce 
rates increase, the number of parental child 
abductions crossing international borders 
also continues to grow. According to 2010 
statistics released by the U.S. Embassy in 
Japan, the number of parental child abduc-
tion cases in Japan almost doubled between 
2007 and 2009. The longstanding child 
custody problems in Japan gained interna-
tional attention last year when an American 
father, Christopher Savoie, was arrested by 
Japanese police after he attempted to take 
his two children to the U.S. Consulate in 
Fukuoka, Japan. Savoie alleged that his 
ex-wife, Noriko, illegally removed their 
children from the United States without 
his knowledge. Upon the couple’s divorce 
in Tennessee, a court granted custody of 
the two children to Noriko and gave Chris-
topher visitation rights. Despite her agree-
ment to stay in the United States, Noriko 
fled to Japan with the two children. After 
spending over two weeks in jail, Savoie 
was released on the condition that he would 
not take his children back to the United 
States.
The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction 
protects parental rights of access to their 
children by providing a legal mechanism 
for returning a child wrongfully removed 
from their country of habitual residence. 
Japan is the only industrialized nation in 
the Group of Seven that has not ratified 
the Convention and the ambassadors from 
the eight Western countries urged Japan to 
sign the Convention, emphasizing that for 
their welfare, children should have access 
to both parents.
The Japanese government regards its 
decision not to sign the Convention as a 
protection for Japanese women and chil-
dren fleeing from abusive relationships 
with foreign nationals. Japanese Foreign 
Minister Katsuya Okada, however, recently 
announced that Japan will review the Con-
vention, a sign that Japan may be con-
sidering a policy change. Whether or not 
Japan ultimately signs the Convention, the 
country must address the growing issue of 
international parental child abduction dis-
putes in order to guarantee parental rights 
and to assure that custodial arrangements 
are made to serve the best interests of the 
children.
Ri Yoo, a J.D. candidate at the Washington 
College of Law, covers East Asia for the 
Human Rights Brief.
SoutheaSt aSia anD oCeania
vietnamese BuDDHist monks anD 
nuns DRiven into HiDing
Several hundred members of the Bud-
dhist Bat Nha monastery, followers of 
internationally-renowned monk Thich 
Naht Hahn, have been driven into hiding, 
illustrating Vietnam’s continued failure to 
respect religious freedom. The monks and 
nuns left the Phuoc Hue pagoda in Viet-
nam’s central Lam Dong province, where 
they have been seeking sanctuary since 
September 2009, after government spon-
sored mobs forcibly removed them from 
Bat Nha. In December 2009, a mob of 
nearly 200 people, many of whom were 
reportedly bused in from distant provinces 
and paid by the government to protest the 
pagoda, dragged the Phuoc Hue abbot from 
his room and forced him to sign an agree-
ment that the sheltered monks and nuns 
would leave the pagoda and return to their 
home provinces by December 31. In the 
days leading up to the deadline, the monks 
and nuns left Phuoc Hue and dispersed into 
an underground network of sympathetic 
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laypeople, with a few dozen likely heading 
to Thailand and France.
Thich Naht Hahn, currently in exile in 
France, founded the Bat Nha monastery 
in 2005 while returning to Vietnam for 
the first time since his 1966 exile. The 
monastery is part of the Unified Buddhist 
Church of Vietnam (UBCV), an illegal 
organization of Buddhists sects, temples 
and monasteries acting as a progressive 
alternative to the government-controlled 
Vietnam Buddhist Church (VBC). Since 
its formation, the UBCV, and especially 
Bat Nha, have experienced considerable 
harassment from both the Vietnamese gov-
ernment and traditional Buddhists, critical 
of the UBCV’s progressive approach. In 
June 2009, a mob of VBC monks burned 
the homes of nuns and beat several monks 
at the monastery. According to eyewit-
nesses, police made no effort to stop the 
violence.
Although Vietnam’s constitution and 
the 2004 Ordinance Regarding Religious 
Belief and Religious Organization pro-
vide for freedom of religion, in practice 
the highly centralized Communist gov-
ernment retains tight controls on all reli-
gious activities. The Office of Religious 
Affairs officially sanctions and oversees 
all religious activity in the country. Even 
state-registered religious groups, including 
many Buddhist and Christian sects, must 
give up considerable autonomy and allow 
government control over clerical appoint-
ments and other internal issues.
Unofficial religious groups, like the 
UBCV and the neo-Buddhist sect Hoa 
Hao, however, remain in constant standoff 
with the government. These groups are not 
allowed to operate educational and train-
ing centers or places of worship. National 
and local security officers have used their 
broad powers to monitor and detain citizens 
in order to harass and imprison leaders of 
unofficial sects. Additionally, the govern-
ment often pressures ethnic minorities to 
convert from their traditional religion to a 
state-sponsored religion.
Although the monks and nuns of Bat 
Nha have been driven underground, they 
remain committed to practicing their faith 
and serving their communities. Sister Nata-
sha, a nun at Thich Naht Hahn’s monastery 
in France, says that the hiding monks and 
nuns “are undeterred from their path, even 
though they must practice underground.” 
A delegation of monks and nuns from 
Thich Naht Hahn’s monastery petitioned 
the French government for temporary asy-
lum for the Bat Nha members. Asylum has 
not been yet granted.
tReating aDDiction tHRougH foRce
Drug users in Cambodia are subject 
to arbitrary arrest and commitment to 
drug treatment facilities, but in a startling 
development, may now also be unwilling 
participants in an experimental drug trial. 
In December 2009, police in Phnom Penh 
reportedly arrested at least seventeen drug 
users and forced them into a drug trial 
for the experimental herbal formula Bong 
Sen at the military run “drug treatment 
center” Orksas Knyom. Bong Sen is an 
unlicensed treatment for opiate addiction, 
which according to its Vietnamese manu-
facturer Ben Tre Fataco, has no side effects 
and enables addicts to recover in five to 
ten days.
Local and international NGOs, includ-
ing Human Rights Watch, have expressed 
significant concern over the Bong Sen tri-
als. In addition to the potentially coercive 
recruitment tactics, these trials were not 
subject to the Ministry of Health’s ethical 
review process. Other ethical problems 
include a lack of informed consent, or safe-
guards for the health of participants. More-
over, after treatment, the detainees were 
released with no opportunity for follow-up 
care or counseling. Local NGOs estimate 
the relapse rate of drug users released from 
Orksas Knyom to be around 100 percent.
If these claims are true, the trials run 
contrary to the World Medical Associa-
tion’s Declaration of Helsinki, the defini-
tive statement of ethical principles for 
human medical research. The Declaration 
mandates, among other things, that all 
human research undergo review by an 
ethics committee, that free and informed 
consent be obtained from each subject, and 
that the subject be able to withdraw partici-
pation at any point in the process.
Cambodia vehemently denies the claims 
made by NGOs. Cambodia’s National 
Authority for Combating Drugs, a col-
laborator in the trials, insists that Bong 
Sen is not a drug but an herbal treatment, 
and as such is not subject to the same ethi-
cal review procedures. Additionally, the 
government denies the assertions that the 
trials were involuntary, maintaining that all 
participants consented to the trial and that 
the treatment was effective.
In the past, the Cambodian govern-
ment has been hesitant to allow drug 
trials on its citizens, and even halted an 
HIV drug trial for human rights concerns. 
This time, however, the government has 
an interest in permitting the trials. With 
considerable financial and technical sup-
port from Vietnam, Cambodia is planning 
to build the country’s first national drug 
rehabilitation center to help combat Cam-
bodia’s rampant drug problem. Bong Sen, 
a Vietnamese drug, would be at least one 
of the treatments provided to patients at 
the proposed center. Ben Tre Fataco has 
been actively involved in the negotiations, 
including being present on at least one of 
the official visits of Vietnamese officials to 
discuss the deal.
As an increasing number of major phar-
maceutical companies outsource their trials 
to developing countries, the prevalence of 
unethical drug trials in these areas has been 
a subject of recent interest for human rights 
and medical organizations. The Bong Sen 
trials in Cambodia highlight this con-
cern. These trials must abide only by the 
host government’s standards, which are 
often minimal and rarely enforced. Since 
the people affected are already some of 
the most vulnerable, the ethical and legal 
implications of drug trials in developing 
countries deserve considerably more atten-
tion. While drug trials offer the possibility 
for new, potentially lifesaving, treatments, 
the human costs of involuntary and uneth-
ical medical testing must be vigilantly 
scrutinized.
moRaLity Law tHReatens 
inDonesian unity
Police arrested four women for “sexy 
dancing” during a New Year’s Eve party 
at the Belair Coyote Bar and Restaurant in 
Bandung, Indonesia. These women, along 
with an event organizer and a manager 
of the club, could be among the first 
charged under Indonesia’s controversial 
anti-pornography law, passed just over one 
year ago. The law’s sweeping reach goes 
beyond merely prohibiting the possession 
of pornographic materials, but also pro-
scribes any public performance or publi-
cation which could “arouse desire.” The 
punishment for the dancers could be up to 
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ten years in jail, while the organizer and 
manager each face fifteen years.
Although it is not clear exactly what 
prompted the arrests, the Belair Coyote 
typically features young women dancing 
in bikinis. Arman Achdiat, chief detective 
for the local police, provided few details. 
When asked what the women were wear-
ing and how they were dancing, he com-
mented, “It could be described as sexy 
dancing. But more importantly, they were 
wearing minimal clothing and performing 
in public, which can stir desires.”
The anti-pornography law has been 
under significant attack since its passage 
in October 2008, but enforcement up until 
now has been rare. Women’s groups, rights 
groups, artists and non-Muslim cultural 
groups have protested the law’s vagueness, 
which leaves wide room for discriminatory 
enforcement. Additionally, some claim that 
the political forces behind the law are using 
the public’s concerns about pornography 
and immorality to eliminate non-Muslim 
cultures in Indonesia. This attempt to elim-
inate minority cultural groups counters 
international law aimed at protecting cul-
tural and minority rights, along with reli-
gious freedom.
For example, in West Java, where Band-
ung is located, concerns center around a 
traditional dance called jaipong, which 
comes from West Java’s Sundanese culture. 
The dance features female dancers moving 
their arms, hands and hips in what critics, 
including West Java’s governor, say is a 
suggestive, sensual manner. With support 
from the Indonesian Ulama Council, a 
leading Muslim clerical organization, the 
government of West Java has made efforts 
to promote the law. Hafizh Utsman, the 
leader of West Java’s branch of the Council, 
stated that “[w]e are trying to eliminate the 
non-Islamic parts of West Java’s traditional 
culture, to make it more Islamic.”
The new law has been challenged in the 
Constitutional Court, but so far has been 
upheld. A broad range of approximately 
thirty rights groups recently challenged the 
law as an unconstitutionally broad threat 
to artistic, religious, and cultural freedom. 
Proponents of the law, however, contin-
ued to articulate its moral necessity. The 
government’s witnesses at the trial argued 
that children’s exposure to explicit images 
is detrimental to their moral and physical 
development, with one government expert 
claiming that watching suggestive images 
“may result in brain damage similar to hav-
ing a traffic accident.”
The anti-pornography law is just one 
example of a growing interconnection 
between Islam and politics in Indone-
sia, which continues to threaten the secu-
lar and diverse political tradition of the 
country. Moreover, widespread discrepan-
cies among the provinces in promoting 
the Islamization of Indonesia evidence 
an increasing divide. While Banda Aceh 
continues to enact stricter sharia laws, the 
governor of Bali declared last year that he 
will not enforce the anti-pornography law. 
Some fear that stringent enforcement of 
the law could further threaten the already-
fraying unity of the Indonesian govern-
ment, and give more fuel to secessionist 
provinces.  HRB
Aileen Thomson, a J.D. candidate at the 
Washington College of Law, covers the 
Southeast Asia and Oceania column for the 
Human Rights Brief.
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